The story unfolding around Venezuela shows how economic interests are increasingly masked by the rhetoric of values.
Formally, the issue is framed as a struggle against dictatorship. In reality, it is a demonstration of the right of the strong to influence the redistribution of resources.
This raises a fundamental question that goes far beyond the Venezuelan case: why are some states allowed to solve their problems through war, while others are categorically forbidden from doing so? And what happens to global stability when such rules become the norm? It is precisely at this point that abstract discussions about values end and applied technologies of pressure begin. For forceful and economic intervention to appear not as a violation of sovereignty but as a "necessary measure,” it requires a universal moral justification — simple, emotionally charged, and understandable to a broad audience. In American foreign policy practice, this justification is increasingly found in the theme of drug trafficking and the image of a "narco-state.”
The 'Narco-State' Thesis as a Convenient Framework
Continuing this logic, American rhetoric actively promotes the claim that the Venezuelan authorities allegedly concentrate all key shadow businesses in their hands, including drug trafficking. The image of a "narco-state” allows the discussion to be shifted from the realm of international law into the sphere of criminal prosecution and moral justification for pressure.
However, even under the hypothetical assumption that such control exists, drugs are incapable of forming the economic foundation of a state. At any scale, this is not a system-forming sector: it does not create a stable budget, does not ensure international status, and does not turn a country into a strategic player. Drug trafficking may enrich elites, but it cannot serve as the foundation of state power.
Oil as the Real Center of the Conflict
The oil sector operates on an entirely different scale. Venezuela possesses the world's largest proven oil reserves — over 300 billion barrels. Even with reduced production, oil remains the main source of potential income and a key factor in the country's geoeconomic weight.
During periods when production exceeded 2-2.5 million barrels per day, oil revenues formed the backbone of foreign currency inflows and made Venezuela a significant player in the global energy market.
It is oil — not drugs — that sharply increases interest in the country from China, India, Turkey, Iran, and the states of the Global South. It is oil that transforms Venezuela from a sanctions target into a potential partner and explains why, despite U. S. pressure, Caracas maintains a broad network of external contacts.
The American Practice of Regime Change
For the American political system, external intervention has long become a routine governance tool: it is faster than passing legislation, cheaper than prolonged diplomacy, and largely removed from direct public oversight.
According to research centers, approximately 285 armed conflicts have occurred worldwide since 1945, with the United States involved in at least 200 of them — between 70 and 85 percent of all cases. The variation in estimates stems from differing interpretations of "involvement,” ranging from full-scale invasions to proxy operations, military advisers, logistics, and intelligence support.
What matters most, however, is something else: in the largest and most severe operations, oil and control over energy flows played a leading role, even when interventions were formally justified by the fight against dictatorship, drugs, terrorism, or humanitarian threats.
This pattern has repeated itself:
- Iran (1953): Nationalization of oil → coup → restoration of external control.
- Libya (2011): Increased autonomy → NATO intervention → state collapse.
- Panama (1989): Loss of manageability → "narco-state” label → invasion.
The sequence is consistent: resource autonomy → delegitimization → force.
What Comes Next?
If the real goal were the elimination of drug trafficking, one would expect the dismantling of criminal networks and a new economic model. This does not happen. The system remains; only its controllability changes.
Washington's message is different: if an acting president can be neutralized, then virtually any undesirable leader can be eliminated. Negotiations are conducted not with opposition forces, but with existing authorities — provided they submit fully to external control.
One of the clearest signals of this shift has been discussions about the return of American oil companies to Venezuela. Oil, not drugs, moves decisively to the foreground.
The Oil Motive: Why the US Really Needs Venezuela
Venezuela officially holds the world's largest proven oil reserves — 303 billion barrels, roughly 20 percent of global reserves.
At current production levels of around 0.8 million barrels per day, recovery remains below 0.3 percent, indicating not depletion, but artificially constrained potential. Venezuela is not a declining oil state, but the largest untapped reserve of future production.
For the United States, control over these volumes means the ability to influence global supply and prices without dependence on the Middle East, Riyadh, or Moscow.
If Venezuela reaches even 3 million barrels per day after a restart, Washington would directly influence about 16 million barrels per day — roughly 22 percent of the global market.
This would:
- Undermine OPEC+ price control mechanisms
- Reduce Brent prices by an estimated $8-10 per barrel
- Pressure Russia and Gulf producers
- Support U. S. refining and domestic markets
China would be particularly affected. Prior to the crisis, Beijing imported around 600,000 barrels per day from Venezuela under oil-for-loans arrangements. U. S. control would push these flows into dollar settlements and sanctions exposure.
Final Conclusion: Why This War Was Needed
In this context, the narrative of a "criminal president” is not the cause, but the decoration. The real objective is control over oil flows, influence over the global energy market, and the weakening of alternative power centers.
International law, under such conditions, ceases to be universal. It becomes an instrument of pressure rather than a guarantor of stability.
If one state can overthrow regimes, detain leaders, and reshape markets while calling it "law enforcement,” the entire global system becomes asymmetrical.
The conclusion is uncomfortable but unavoidable: in a world of double standards, security is ensured not by law, but by power.
And in such a world, being weak is deadly dangerous.
