Tomahawks and Ukraine: Technical Hurdles and Strategic Considerations

Among Russian experts, the potential transfer of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has generated a rather calm, sometimes even flippant, attitude. The prevailing opinion is that the system is old, well-understood, and therefore unlikely to significantly impact the ongoing conflict between Russia and NATO. But let's examine the history of this weapon and explore the potential risks it could bring.

Photo: commons.wikimedia.org by U.S. Navy photo by Intelligence Specialist 1st Class Kenneth Moll., https://creativecommons.org/public-domain/pdm/

USS Cape St. George (CG 71) fires a tomahawk missile in support of OIF

Russian Air Defense Can Intercept Tomahawks

A widespread belief-bold in its simplicity but weakly substantiated-is that Tomahawks pose little threat. This confidence dates back to the late Soviet era and was widely discussed during and after the 1991 Gulf War, when a U. S.-led coalition fought Iraq over Kuwait. During this operation, the U. S. launched nearly 300 Tomahawk missiles at Iraqi targets, reportedly achieving an 85% success rate according to American sources.

However, Iraq's Soviet-made Osa short-range air defense system successfully intercepted some Tomahawks. Remarkably, the Osa is an older system from the early 1970s-ten years older than the Tomahawks-and export models are generally less capable than those in domestic service. This success story of the Osa against Tomahawks has become a cornerstone of faith in Russia's air defenses, creating a perception that Tomahawks are not particularly formidable. Yet, it's important to remember that no air defense system is infallible.

Real-World Effectiveness: Gulf War and Yugoslavia

Determining Tomahawk effectiveness is difficult, as the U. S. rarely publishes full data. During the Gulf War, American forces relied more heavily on manned aircraft than missiles-suggesting limitations in missile effectiveness. Approximately 1,500 aircraft were deployed, with losses totaling 75 planes and helicopters over 1.5 months.

In 1999, NATO bombed Yugoslavia, using over 200 Tomahawks. Yugoslav sources reported that around 40 missiles were intercepted, illustrating the vulnerability of these cruise missiles. Some estimates claimed up to 55% interception, though such optimism is debated. Importantly, most Tomahawks were shot down by sheer volumes of anti-aircraft fire rather than precision targeting. Flying at subsonic speeds of under 900 km/h-and often navigating terrain-these missiles were simply overwhelmed by dense defensive fire.

Tomahawks in Syria

The Tomahawk also featured in U. S. strikes against Syria in 2017 and 2018, in response to alleged chemical attacks. In April 2017, U. S. forces launched 59 missiles, but only 23 hit their targets. A significant number-36 missiles-disappeared, raising questions about reliability and potential electronic warfare interference. The following year, a joint U. S.-U.K.-France strike deployed over 100 missiles, including 60 Tomahawks, resulting in varied damage reports. Russian military sources suggested 46 missiles were intercepted in total.

These incidents provided Russian forces in Syria with valuable experience analyzing Tomahawk technology, though they were all sea-launched missiles, which can be detected at long range-a different challenge compared to potential land-based launches near Ukraine.

Ukraine and the Navy Issue

One major argument against sending Tomahawks to Ukraine is straightforward: Ukraine lacks a fleet capable of launching them. Almost all carriers are U. S. or U. K. warships or submarines. Ukraine currently has only small boats, a couple of minesweepers, and a corvette under construction. None of these platforms can host Tomahawk launchers.

However, alternatives exist. In 2023, the U. S. deployed the Typhon mobile land-based launcher, capable of firing Tomahawks from a truck chassis. Limited production is planned, with only five batteries globally. Despite its strategic significance, this platform demonstrates that land-based deployment is technically feasible. Additionally, the Mk41 modular launch system, used widely on NATO ships, can be installed virtually anywhere, including on land or even adapted for rail.

Conclusion

In summary, delivering Tomahawks to Ukraine is technically possible for the U. S., with multiple deployment options available. Expert counterarguments largely rest on assumptions rather than insurmountable technical limitations. While Russian officials stress the potential impact on U. S.-Russia relations, history shows that strategic and political considerations rarely prevent Washington from supplying advanced weapons when it sees fit.

Ultimately, much of the discussion around Tomahawks is media and political signaling-often preceding the fact itself. When the debate begins, the weapon is already on its way.