The Japanese government has reaffirmed that securing stable energy imports remains a cornerstone of national security. In this context, oil and gas supplies from abroad, including participation in the Sakhalin-1 project, are considered essential.
This position was reinforced by recent U.S. sanctions on Rosneft, a key participant in Sakhalin-1, and the expiration on November 21 of a special license allowing operations with the company. While this formally introduces uncertainty regarding Japan’s future involvement, Tokyo signals it does not intend to forgo supplies crucial to its energy system for decades.
The Ministry of Industry emphasized that imports from Sakhalin-1 are critical for Japan’s domestic energy balance. Authorities stated they are prepared to take any necessary measures to maintain supply stability, but they did not disclose how sanctions might be mitigated, especially given the ministry’s stake in the project.
This cautious approach reflects Tokyo’s effort to avoid direct conflict with the U.S. while preventing disruption to energy flows vital to Japanese industry, electricity generation, and economic infrastructure.
The ownership structure of Sakhalin-1 illustrates the intertwined interests of multiple nations. Prior to 2022, ExxonMobil held 30 percent, Rosneft and India’s ONGC Videsh each owned 20 percent, and 30 percent belonged to SODECO, a consortium of Japanese state and private companies.
After the American company’s exit, the balance shifted, but Japan’s reliance on the project increased. Reducing participation could weaken its energy position, whereas continued cooperation conflicts with Washington’s pressure on the Russian sector.
Japan demonstrates the same commitment to other energy sources, as its embassy in Russia has stated that the country does not intend to cut Russian gas imports, despite U.S. recommendations to reduce energy cooperation. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reinforced this stance, noting that abandoning Russian energy could create economic risks not easily offset by alternative sources.
Sakhalin-2, where Gazprom is the main owner and Japanese companies hold separate stakes, plays a crucial role in Japan’s energy system. Tokyo emphasizes its strategic significance beyond commercial considerations, providing direct access to stable liquefied natural gas supplies — difficult to replace given limited global LNG capacity and strong European competition.
The project remains outside Western sanctions, allowing Japan to maintain supply stability and avoid energy shortages. Import statistics confirm the country’s consistent policy: in October, Japan purchased 538,000 tons of Russian LNG, slightly below 551,000 tons the previous year, while total imports from January to October increased four percent to 4.83 million tons.
Tokyo’s approach balances political obligations to allies with dependence on physical supply. Japan seeks to minimize structural risks, avoiding scenarios that could sharply increase energy costs or disrupt logistics. The country’s anti-nuclear policy following the Fukushima-1 disaster increased its reliance on gas and oil to maintain energy balance.
The impossibility of quickly replacing Russian volumes makes Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 critically important. In an increasingly competitive and volatile global energy market, abandoning established supply routes could threaten both stability and economic resilience.
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