György Varga, former head of the OSCE mission in Russia, doctor of international relations theory, member of the public council of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and ambassador, talks to Pravda.Ru special correspondent Darya Aslamova about why Hungary defends its sovereignty, why Europe is losing economic power, how London came to dictate foreign policy, how the war in Ukraine facilitates centralization of power in Brussels, and which two conditions might stop the conflict.
EU centralization, London’s influence, and Hungary’s stance
— Hello, Mr. Varga. We’re speaking in Budapest, Hungary’s capital, about your country’s foreign policy. Hungary is a small state with a modest population, yet it has become the focus of global players. Why is that? How do you explain Hungary’s outsized influence?
— It’s hard to give a single answer for why Hungary became the epicenter of these processes, but one can suggest a reason. Few governments inside the European Union pursue a policy of defending national sovereignty; Hungary has done so for nearly two decades. That irritates the globalists.
Those tendencies become especially visible in a time of conflict and war. When decision-making speeds up, globalists prefer a single, centralized, one-dimensional foreign ministry within the EU — it makes coordination faster. But if a country insists on its own position, can argue its case, and proposes alternative settlement terms, that becomes an obstacle.
Is Europe gearing up for war?
— In Russia people watch Europe very closely. It seems obvious to us — I don’t know how obvious it is here — that Europe is preparing for a big war with Russia. We see not just statements but facts: heavy rearmament, massive budgets, ports, airfields and roads being prepared. This is de-facto militarization. Do you agree?
— Yes, I agree that this process is underway. I fear it myself because I don’t believe it leads to peace. If we raise the level of militarization, we will later look for opportunities to use the military hardware we produce in such large volumes now.
At the NATO summit in July they decided to allocate 5% of GDP to defense spending. That’s a big rise — the previous benchmark was 2%.
The defense budget will increase by about 2.5 times. That means larger armed forces and much more equipment. We are building a power that, in my view, will not promote peace.
I oppose this process, but it’s already happening. This is not mere ideology — these are concrete steps and decisions that have been taken. What happens next — in ten years or later — what uses those budgets will see, we don’t yet know. It could lead to a peaceful Europe, or it could lead to the use of accumulated military strength.
“We are building a power that, in my view, will not promote peace.”
The Russia–Ukraine conflict: a proxy war?
— In Russia we treat the Russia–Ukraine conflict not as a bilateral dispute with Ukraine but as a confrontation with NATO and the West. How do you assess it?
— Now, after Donald Trump became President of the United States again, it’s easier to speak about this. Mr. Trump and his administration recognize that this is a proxy war between the U.S. and Russia fought on Ukrainian soil.
On 6 March this year, Mr. Marco Rubio , the U.S. Secretary of State, acknowledged that this is a proxy war. So that is the official U.S. position.
If the U.S. defines it this way, then naturally NATO allies are involved too. The United States is the most powerful country and effectively leads the alliance. Here lies a contradiction: on the one hand, the leader admits it’s a proxy war; on the other, he says it should be ended as soon as possible.
Trump’s policy and the 'coalition of the willing'
— We see that the U.S. president does not always act consistently, but by October 2025 Mr. Trump had taken steps aimed at settling the conflict. First, he acknowledged that it is a proxy war. Second, he recognized legitimate Russian security interests at its borders. He also said that had he been president in 2020 this war would not have started. He argued that responsibility lies not only with Russia’s president but also with the presidents of Ukraine and the United States.
Later he decided to stop funding the war. For the American people that is a positive step. But for us Europeans it is not so positive, because now Europe will bear the financial burden.
Here we see a contradiction: there is the policy of the Trump administration and there is the policy of the so-called “coalition of the willing.”
As we observe, this group was initiated and is led by the United Kingdom. On 2 March, when the coalition formed, it became clear that London held the strongest interest. Two weeks ago the coalition met again in London.
It’s obvious the coalition does not want to finance the war itself. It seeks to shift that burden onto the European Union and NATO countries. The coalition has fewer members; it can finance, but it does not want to. Its goal is to have the entire EU assume the costs. In effect, Britain tries to transfer the financial responsibility for the war to the EU.
Has London taken over EU foreign policy?
— This raises a separate question of propriety. Britain left the European Union years ago. Yet European elites — people like Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas — have effectively handed EU foreign policy to London.
— Yes. Today, de facto, the United Kingdom guides EU foreign policy on Ukraine and Russia. From a moral standpoint, that’s even insulting. I am a citizen of an EU country, and the British prime minister — of a state that is not a Union member — determines EU foreign policy on key matters: Ukraine, Russia, war. Sometimes that policy even runs counter to the approach of the Trump administration.
When Mr. Trump returned to power, he said plainly: “This is not my war.” He showed a desire to exit the conflict, to shift responsibility to Europe. Apparently, he has not yet succeeded.
The U.S.: participant or mediator?
— At first there was talk of a full halt to funding, but weapons deliveries have continued without pause. Mr. Trump failed to make this solely Europe’s war. The U.S. remains a participant. How do you explain this failure?
— Because of Europe’s stubbornness — certain forces that now hold power there. Let me try to formulate the problem for myself. Mr. Trump said during last year’s campaign he wants to stop this war. After 20 January, when he took office again, he continued that line.
Sometimes it seems Trump genuinely seeks a settlement, but at the same time he remains willing to supply weapons and continues the cooperation that existed under Mr. Biden — intelligence sharing, training, and so on.
Why does this happen? I think the root is the U.S.’s double role in the conflict. On the one hand, the U.S. is a participant in the war. Mr. Rubio acknowledged that the United States fights Russia on Ukrainian soil. That is the role of a participant. On the other hand, the U.S. claims the role of mediator: Mr. Trump offers himself as a broker ready to help end the conflict.
That duality — continuing the war while acting as mediator, maintaining support for European allies while presenting oneself as a peacemaker — creates an internal contradiction. And as we’ve seen in nine months of his presidency, playing both roles is extremely difficult.
There were meetings: 15 August — a meeting with the Russian president in Alaska; 18 August — a meeting in Washington with the Ukrainian president and members of the “willing” club; then, hours before the Ukrainian president’s U.S. visit on 17 October, a Budapest meeting with the Russian president was announced and cancelled a few days later. Those constant oscillations show the contradiction between the administration’s two roles — mediator and participant.
Europe rebels — or refuses to follow?
— It looks as if Alaska produced a path toward settlement, but suddenly European states — previously U.S. satellites — rebelled. Is this a revolt against the boss?
— I agree: that is precisely what happened. Under European pressure, the Budapest meeting was cancelled.
I assess the consequences and say this: European elites, in my view, make a grave mistake.
Those elites risk destroying the European Union. They risk destroying Europe itself.
And the facts we see are alarming.
Economic decline and the cost of sanctions
— You said that in 2008 the EU’s economy was stronger than the U.S. economy?
— Yes. In 2008 the EU’s GDP stood at roughly $16 trillion, while the U.S. was $14 trillion. Sixteen years passed. By 2024 the U.S. GDP grew from $14 to $29 trillion — a rise of more than 100%. The EU went from $16 to $19 trillion — at most a 20% increase in 16 years. What kind of management runs the EU? Why such poor results?
Look at Germany — it faces deindustrialization. In Italy and France public debt exceeds 100% of GDP. In Greece it reaches 150%. Yet these countries calmly vote for new sanctions that act like straitjackets on the economies of 27 EU states.
— Do you believe sanctions harm the EU’s own economy?
— Yes. If politicians feel responsibility for their countries, they should think about the consequences when they approve a nineteenth sanctions package. Those sanctions strike economic actors inside the EU itself.
The EU abandoned Russian energy — gas and oil — and now buys from the U.S., sometimes at four to five times the price. It withdrew from the Russian market: car plants, factories — everything passed to China and other countries.
As a global economic player, the EU has 450 million people versus 1.5 billion in China — three to four times more labor force. Europe renounced cheap energy while China secured it. Technologies compare favorably, but China gets resources cheaper. By every metric, China wins.
And Europe? It keeps adopting measures that hurt itself. If there was a 19th sanctions package, there will be a 20th. All this arises from ideological aims to win a war in which the EU officially does not participate. NATO and the EU are not combatants — that’s their official position. Then why destroy yourselves?
This policy doesn’t even help Ukraine. Plus, the goal of inviting Ukraine into the EU and granting it membership is problematic. When the EU lost the ability to compete with the U.S., China, India, we worsen the crisis by inviting a country at war. That effectively imports war into the EU — with all its consequences.
Membership standards and the risk of importing war
— You say candidate requirements used to be stricter?
— Yes. When Hungary joined NATO in 1999 and then the EU in 2004, the entry criteria were serious. For example, a candidate could not join with unresolved historical disputes.
Hungary signed basic agreements with Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. We closed all historical disputes related to the First and Second World Wars. We recognized borders, and our neighbors accepted obligations to protect the Hungarian national minority. Only in those conditions could we join the EU.
Today, looking at Ukraine, legally Kyiv might insist on the 1991 borders, but in practice no one knows where new borders will form. No one knows the exact population — is it 20, 30, 40 million? These are open questions.
If Ukraine joins the EU while at war, the EU itself pulls into the war.
That means the conflict’s consequences spread to 450 million EU citizens. Economically, it means the Union assumes legal obligations to finance the war.
Today, such obligations do not exist. Some countries finance voluntarily if they wish. But the “willing” club wants everyone to join. If Ukraine becomes an official EU member, the Union must bear political, economic and financial responsibility — for Ukraine and for the continuation of war in Europe. This is a very complicated situation that I observe firsthand.
Will the EU survive?
— You yourself say EU policy leads to the Union’s destruction. Do you believe in the EU’s future as a structure?
— I won’t claim they intend to destroy the EU. I’ll say they will destroy it. I don’t think they do so deliberately. I hope not. But in effect — they are destroying it.
Political cohesion breaks down: not all countries agree with current policies. Moral cohesion stands threatened too.
If someone inside the EU or NATO can blow up strategic infrastructure — as with Nord Stream — that’s a serious signal.
There are theories that Ukraine took part in those explosions. Germany asked Poland to hand over a Ukrainian citizen linked to the case. Poland refused. Poland’s prime minister said the problem is the pipeline itself, not its explosion. That already marks a moral conflict.
We live in a Union where destroying a partner’s infrastructure seems more permissible than ending the war. That contradiction is stark. Recently Poland’s foreign minister, Mr. Radosław Sikorski , expressed hope that Ukrainian drones would destroy parts of the “Druzhba” oil pipeline to Slovakia and Hungary. We’re talking about destroying allies’ infrastructure — countries that aren’t even EU members. These are the nuances that are hard to understand. What I see behind these processes is panic.
Responsibility and political panic
— You say some politicians bear responsibility for the war’s causes?
— Yes. This is panic: when politicians, partly involved in creating the conflict, try to distance themselves. Mr. Sikorski, for example, on 21 February 2014 was one of the guarantors of the agreement between President Yanukovych and the Ukrainian opposition to resolve the domestic political crisis. The agreement also bore the signatures of Mr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier — now Germany’s president — and Mr. Sikorski, then Poland’s foreign minister.
But the next day a coup took place. None of those guarantors said: “I was there, I disagree, I demand sanctions against those who violated the agreement.” I never heard Sikorski or Steinmeier raise that publicly.
— Looking ahead, how long do you expect the EU to survive as a structure?
— Here is how I see it: the Lisbon Treaty functions like the EU’s constitution. If it says that decisions on foreign policy require consensus, then that is the law. If one or two countries disagree with proposals from Paris, Berlin or Brussels, then the decision does not pass.
Foreign policy is the maximum area requiring agreement. If that consensus does not exist, then one must set more modest goals or leave such questions to the diplomacy of 27 nations. That is the principle.
If the treaty says member states keep the right to decide where to buy energy, then that too is law. No one should interfere in our gas or oil choices. No one wants an EU in which privileged politicians determine other countries’ fates.
Hungary’s sovereignty
— Do you think Hungary must preserve sovereignty?
— My personal view: sovereignty is our national pride. Hungarian statehood stretches back more than a thousand years. We never gave up sovereignty — under the Mongol-Tatar invasions in the 13th century, under the Turks, in the Austro-Hungarian era, under Nazi Germany, even under the Warsaw Pact.
Today, despite pressure from Ms. Ursula von der Leyen , Hungary will not relinquish sovereignty — especially in foreign policy. If a country loses the right to make independent decisions, it ceases to exist as a subject in international affairs.
Decisions shouldn’t be made on our behalf in Brussels, Berlin or Paris. The EU serves useful purposes — economic integration matters. But beyond that, we should not give up sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty provides integration for routine matters, not the transfer of foreign-policy sovereignty. That transfer would endanger us and is unacceptable.
The EU as an economic zone — and the danger of centralizing war policy
— European integration has clear benefits: the Schengen area makes travel easier, and the single market matters. The EU can act as a global actor — the combined economy, technology and human potential of 27 nations is powerful. But the problem lies in foreign policy: Brussels and member states must respect rules, including the right to disagree. Consensus is mandatory; some now want to decide without it, and we oppose that.
The EU must operate within the rules. If consensus is required, no one should try to strip Hungary of its voice simply because it opposes a proposed measure that conflicts with its national interests.
Used correctly, the EU strengthens member states’ global representation. But today the war in Ukraine becomes a pretext to centralize power in the EU. Some politicians, on behalf of globalists, absolutize the war.
Escalation under the pretext of speed
— So you mean that under the pretext of acting quickly, leaders push through decisions without consensus?
— Yes. They say: we must act fast. Fast, however, often means without consensus. If this practice continues, in two years some countries will have lost sovereignty.
President Emmanuel Macron ’s approval rating this week sits at 11%, and he claims he’s ready to send 2,000 legionnaires to Ukraine. He would do better to focus on France’s domestic problems than escalate the war.
And no one speaks of how to end it. There are two core causes of the conflict: Ukraine’s absence of neutrality and the discrimination of national minorities.
Mr. Trump has already said Ukraine cannot join NATO. But the “willing” club has not yet moved in that direction. Guaranteeing neutrality would be a simple fix.
The second issue is minority rights. Since 2014 Hungarians, Poles, Romanians and Russians have suffered. In December 2023 a law restored 70–80% of rights to Hungarians, Poles and Bulgarians, but it did not return rights to the Russian minority — this omission is recorded in the December 8 law.
The EU could intervene. Since 2014 millions have suffered — this can become a cause for war from a larger neighbor. Authorities should have warned Ukraine that Russia, a permanent U.N. Security Council member with historical, cultural and linguistic ties, might not tolerate that situation.
If the “willing” club truly wants to end the war, it must act on two fronts: secure Ukraine’s neutrality and guarantee human rights, including the full restoration of national minorities’ rights. Arms deliveries alone will not solve these two strategic causes at the heart of the conflict.
“If the ‘willing’ club truly wants to end the war, it must secure Ukraine’s neutrality and fully restore minority rights.”
