Military analyst and political scientist Dmitry Taran summarizes four years of Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO). In an interview with Pravda.Ru, he reflects on the hybrid nature of the conflict with the collective West, explains the logic of a war of attrition, assesses the likelihood of mobilization, and comments on the prospects of the Russian economy under sanctions.
Q: February 24, 2026, marked four years since the start of Russia's Special Military Operation in Ukraine. What conclusions can be drawn? What have we achieved?
A: This is a frequently asked question, and it must be answered as honestly as possible. First, the focus should be shifted: this is not really a war or just a conflict — it is a Special Military Operation on the territory of the former Soviet Union. And this operation is not against Ukraine alone, but against the united West, which has armed parts of the former Soviet territory with various types of weaponry.
The fact that combat operations are ongoing as a war of attrition indicates that we are not fighting Ukraine per se. We are fighting the United Kingdom and, more broadly, the collective West. After Ryabkov's statement in December 2021, "dirty” weapons were actively introduced. Ukraine had been prepared for war since 2014.
Q: What do you mean by "dirty" weapons?
A: Weapons of mass destruction, arms with various nuclear components, enriched uranium, and similar capabilities.
Q: So this kind of weapon is already there?
A: Of course. They prepared for multiple scenarios. This is a conflict with the united West, in the acronym NATO, and it is happening on our territory.
If this were another country without our people, names, and history, it could be resolved in two or three months with strategic strikes. But here, strategic goals are at stake: denazification, demilitarization, and the elimination of the "anti-Russia” project, whose sponsors are outside the former USSR.
Therefore, the conflict follows this scenario. One can say, "You are achieving nothing.” But we are solving entirely different tasks. Now the fight is one of attrition — whoever falls first loses. We do not throw all forces forward or rush recklessly. Capturing territory or addressing Ukraine's internal political issues directly does not solve the whole problem. We are in a conflict with the collective West, which has prepared for this over a long period. It cannot be concluded with a two-week operation.
Q: Let's recall the beginning. The formation of over 100,000 personnel entered from different directions. This could not be hidden — satellites were monitoring. The plan relied on Zelensky's government resigning. Until Istanbul, this was possible.
A: But the British intervened, pressed their initiative, and the operation became protracted. We effectively faced the entire collective West on this theater of operations. Their and our military-industrial complexes started operating in preparation for future conflicts against the backdrop of a changing world order and financial system.
Four years should not alarm anyone. This is not a war with Ukraine — it is a long confrontation with the West. Once a century, we play these historical games: the Entente, France, now NATO. This is the latest centennial game.
Q: Should I understand that after the initial plan failed, we switched to a war of attrition? Is this Plan B?
A: You ask as if I have full operational and diplomatic information. From open sources, we can see a complex diplomatic game. The West is not united. The conflict is hybrid — economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational. We try to fragment the collective West, which is itself heterogeneous with differing national interests.
Plan B, maybe C or even D — there are many options. Our task is to preserve statehood and territorial integrity and address the consequences of the Soviet Union's collapse.
NATO promised not to expand eastward. Ten times they said one thing, did another. Eastern European countries now host NATO bases and reduced flight times — this concerns our security. It is being addressed. But I cannot provide exhaustive answers without access to diplomatic information.
Q: Is mobilization necessary?
A: As of February 24, 2026, considering current mobilization resources, I believe it is not. If the geopolitical balance changes, different options may emerge. For now, it is unnecessary to alarm the population. The situation may evolve — we will monitor.
Q: The West presents mobilization as the main destabilizing factor for Russia, suggesting that everyone would rebel if it were announced.
A: They want to destabilize us. They operate on all fronts — economic, political, informational. But let them dream. Their scenarios are cinematic. Our headquarters have counterarguments and countermeasures. Panic is unnecessary.
Q: Can the economy withstand several more years of the Special Military Operation? Will the state maintain social obligations?
A: Recently, a senior security official overseeing external intelligence and the economy described attacks on our tankers as piracy. Responses will follow.
Forecasting is thankless. We live in conditions where new variables arise daily, and scenarios may take unexpected turns. Predicting four years ahead is overly ambitious. Let's focus on the first half of 2026 and see how the situation develops. Remember the key point: this is not a war with Ukraine, but a long hybrid war with the collective West, which openly declares that we should not exist — as a state, territorially, or physically.
This is about strategic survival — every person with a Russian passport and every Russian-speaking individual. In this context, both potential mobilization and intellectual mobilization are about maintaining order and preventing panic.
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