Who's next after Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh?

Israel's recent attack to annihilate Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas leader, has generated a few questions that one may have difficulty answering: "How did that happen?" The questions for the entire Iranian leadership are: "Who is to blame?" and "What is going to happen now?"

Photo: commons.wikimedia.org by Sonia Sevilla, CC BY-SA 3.0

Who's next to get killed at Hamas after Ismail Haniyeh

Israel confirmed the death of Fuad Shukr, the head of Hezbollah's strategic unit, immediately after the strike. Yet, after the attack to kill Haniyeh, the IDF claimed that it did not launch any missiles in the direction where he was staying.

Journalists, observers and experts continue analyzing photographs of the residential building in which Ismail Haniyeh was staying at the moment of the attack.

Version 1: Missile strike by Israeli Air Force

This version does not hold water, because the distance from the nearest Israeli Air Force base, where tactical aircraft capable of carrying out such a mission are stationed, amounts to 1,500 kilometers. However, Israeli aircraft would have to fly through the airspace of the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, which means that air defense systems of one of these countries would have detected their flight to the launch area.

The most preferable route seems to be the one over the territory of Lebanon, through the northern regions of Syria, with a subsequent flight over the adjacent Kurdish regions of Iraq and then through the airspace of Iran from the north. The range of such a flight in one direction amounts to at least 1,800 kilometers. This region is the zone of partial activity of Turkish radar stations located along the southern border.

Most importantly, such a flight requires not only tankers, but also tactical electronic warfare aircraft. After all, state-of-the-art stealth F-35A fighters consume a lot of fuel. As a result, taking into account the above-mentioned factors, this version looks unlikely. To crown it all, a missile strike on a building normally causes more extensive destruction than that shown in the photographs.

However, it was this version that IRGC representatives started advertising actively after the attack. This version exclude their blunder and lays all the blame on air defences and the army of the country.

Version 2:  Anti-tank guided missile

A number of analysts agree that Haniyeh was killed in an operation planned by Israeli intelligence services. During the operation, one of the recruited Hamas members could supposedly inform Israeli intelligence services about the timing of Haniyeh's stay in Tehran and his approximate schedule.

Israeli intelligence officers could leave for their mission in the dark and launch two Spike-type anti-tank guided missiles with a range of two to four kilometers (a portable modification of the ATGM). The television guidance system of this missile makes it possible to accurately hit a target even if the operator stays indoors.

To mislead Iranian counterintelligence, the Israeli intelligence officers could take the launchers with them. This version appears to be plausible indeed as the fairly strong reinforced concrete structure facade of the building was only partially damaged.

If this is the case, one shall assume that there are serious gaps in ensuring counterintelligence support for visits of high-ranking representatives of Iran-friendly organizations to Tehran. It also shows that Israeli specialists have proven their intelligence, organizational and executive capabilities to annihilate key figures in the confrontation between Israel and Iran.

It is worthy of note that the United States and Israel have repeatedly used similar tactics of pinpoint attacks before.

Version 3: UAV attack

It is believed that Israeli intelligence used a special unmanned aerial vehicle to conduct the attack. The vehicle carried two kamikaze drones that carried out a pinpoint strike into the window of the room where Haniyeh was staying. It appears that surveillance cameras recorded the moment when the UAV carrier drone took off, but its subsequent flight route was off the radar.

Given the level of unmanned technology in Israel, such a version has a right to exist. If so, why did the Iranian anti-drone protection for one of the most prestigious military facilities fail? Can such a drone fly into another window of another Iranian leader tomorrow?

Version 4: Explosive device

The phase of expansion and the nature of the operation to annihilate a high-ranking Hamas member suggest that in order to carry out the assigned mission, the Israeli special services resorted to their agents from among local residents. With a high degree of probability, a directional explosive device was planted in advance into the structure of the residential building in which Haniyeh was staying, which made it possible to minimize destruction and secondary damage.

In conclusion

According to The Telegraph, the Iranian leadership is horrified by the fact that the IRGC took part in the assassination attempt. Iranian officials are certain that there was a more influential mastermind of the attack in the ranks of the Guard Corps. This creates an atmosphere of total mistrust and suspicion within the Iranian leadership. Ayatollah Khamenei wants answers before Iran could take revenge on Israel, the newspaper said.

This is not the first time when an act of assassination in Tehran sows panic and triggers a persecution mania within the Iranian ruling class. The theft of nuclear archives, the murder of the chief engineer of a nuclear project, the liquidation of prominent military personnel has created the impression that Iran is flooded with Israeli agents.

Iran's response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh will most likely be limited. Israel is capable of liquidating even the Supreme Leader of Iran, which may sow chaos and incite internal strife in Iran. The Iranian military and the IRGC will thus be distracted from thoughts about a massive strike on Israeli territory.