European energy policy in recent years has become increasingly shaped by geopolitics rather than pure economic logic. Following the sharp reduction of Russian gas imports in 2022 and the declared goal of phasing them out entirely by 2027, the European Union now faces a new dilemma: reducing dependence on one major supplier almost inevitably leads to deeper reliance on another.
Today, that supplier is the United States, which has rapidly filled the vacuum on the European market. According to industry statistics, in the first half of this year, liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into Europe rose by 25 percent compared with the same period last year, reaching a record 92 billion cubic meters. More than half of this volume—about 55 percent—came from the U.S. Russia, despite political statements about a full energy embargo, still ranked second with 14 percent.
U.S. LNG Dominates Europe’s Market
This dynamic shows that the replacement of Russian pipeline gas is happening mainly through U.S. LNG. The structure of dependency has not disappeared; it has merely transformed. EU officials openly stress their readiness to deepen energy cooperation with the U.S., presenting it as a matter of security. In reality, however, Europe is swapping one monopoly for another.
Analysts at Reuters forecast that if current trends continue, the U.S. share of European LNG imports could reach 70 percent. Should an additional 16 billion cubic meters now supplied through the TurkStream pipeline be substituted, that figure would surpass 80 percent—the highest concentration of gas imports in EU history.
Economic and Strategic Risks for the EU
Even at these levels, the numbers do not tell the full story, since Europe also relies on pipeline deliveries from Norway, Azerbaijan, and North Africa. In total, American gas could account for around 23 percent of Europe’s overall imports. By comparison, before 2022, Russia supplied roughly 40 percent of all EU gas imports.
This raises serious concerns. First, heavy reliance on one source reduces flexibility and leaves Europe vulnerable to both price volatility and political leverage. Second, U.S. LNG logistics—liquefaction, tanker transport, and regasification—make it significantly more expensive than Russian pipeline gas. While Europe was willing to pay a premium during the 2022 energy crisis, long-term costs could undermine industrial competitiveness. Third, the EU’s proclaimed goal of energy independence appears increasingly hollow. Instead of building resilience through renewables, Europe risks replacing one dependency with another.
Thus, the EU’s current policy may solve short-term challenges but at the price of creating long-term risks. While dependence on American LNG may seem secure under transatlantic alliances, it leaves Europe with far less room for maneuver in its energy future.
