US Moves Into Argentina With $7 Billion: What Trump Gains From His Alliance With Milei

The alliance between Javier Milei and Donald Trump is gradually evolving from political affinity into a major economic project. The US Export-Import Bank and Argentina have signed an agreement that could mobilize up to $7 billion through the end of 2027. The funds are expected to support energy projects, power grids, critical minerals, digital infrastructure and advanced technologies. But this is not a gift from Washington to Buenos Aires.

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Argentina flag

EXIM is the US government's export-credit agency, whose responsibilities include supporting American companies and jobs. The agreement explicitly calls for the use of US equipment, technology and expertise. Argentina therefore gains access to financing, while American businesses gain access to a potentially enormous market.

There is also a geopolitical objective. Argentina possesses enormous shale oil and gas resources in Vaca Muerta, as well as major reserves of lithium and copper — raw materials essential for producing batteries, electric vehicles and a significant share of modern electronics. The United States is seeking to build its own secure supply chains for critical minerals and reduce the West's dependence on China.

The problem for Washington is that China is already deeply integrated into Argentina's economy. It buys soybeans, meat and lithium, has invested in energy and railways, and has provided Buenos Aires with a currency swap worth roughly $18 billion. The United States has openly sought to reduce Argentina's dependence on this mechanism, describing it as a tool of Chinese influence. Beijing rejects those accusations. 

During his presidential campaign, Milei promised a very different Argentina: dollarization, the closure of the central bank, a radical reduction in the size of the state, and an end to political cooperation with "communist" China and Brazil. He has implemented part of that agenda, sharply cutting government spending, achieving a budget surplus and bringing monthly inflation down from 25.5% in December 2023 to around 2% by spring 2026.

But some of his most high-profile promises had to be revised. Dollarization did not happen, and the central bank has not been closed — Milei now speaks of reforming it instead. Argentina has also not turned away from China: during the first year of his presidency, exports to China increased by roughly 15%. Economic necessity proved stronger than campaign rhetoric.

The results of the reforms are also mixed. After an initial recovery, the economy is showing renewed weakness: in July 2026, economic activity fell 1.4% year on year, while industrial output declined by 4.6%. Poverty, which had fallen sharply after the initial crisis period of the reforms, rose again in the first half of 2026, from 28.2% to 32.3%.

Washington's interest in Argentina is therefore far from charitable. The United States gains an opportunity to strengthen its position in a country with enormous reserves of gas, lithium and copper, generate orders for American companies and simultaneously push China back in South America. Milei gets what Argentina chronically lacks — investment, technology and access to dollar resources.

But Buenos Aires cannot abandon Beijing in favor of Washington either. As a result, Argentina, which Milei promised to free from its previous dependencies, finds itself caught between two superpowers: it needs American money for future development, while the Chinese market and financial ties remain essential today.