The European Union is moving toward a new strategy for imposing sanctions on Russia, a shift that could expose deeper divisions within the bloc and fuel institutional tensions over the decision-making process.
The 21st sanctions package against Russia may become the last to follow the traditional format. According to Financial Times, citing sources familiar with the discussions, EU officials are considering adopting future sanctions individually or in thematic groups rather than as large, comprehensive packages. The proposal comes after repeated delays caused by the use of veto powers by individual member states.
Negotiations over the 21st sanctions package stretched on for several weeks because of Greece's firm position. Athens withheld its approval until its shipping company Dynagas received a temporary exemption allowing it to continue transporting Russian liquefied natural gas to third countries.
To overcome objections from other member states, including Bulgaria, Italy, Germany, and Portugal, negotiators removed several measures from the final package. These included sanctions against Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, restrictions targeting Lukoil President Vagit Alekperov, and a proposed ban on imports of Russian fish.
In previous rounds of negotiations, countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and Greece could publicly support tougher sanctions while Hungary's veto or delaying tactics absorbed much of the political attention. During lengthy negotiations between Brussels and Budapest, other member states continued trading with Russia while maintaining favorable relations with the European Commission.
As Hungary's role as the principal opponent of sanctions has diminished, other countries have become more visible in defending their own national interests. Greece, Malta, and Cyprus continue to oppose measures targeting Russia's so-called shadow fleet and oil transportation because of the importance of maritime shipping to their economies. Germany and Italy have sought to remove industrial chemicals essential to their manufacturing sectors from sanctions lists. Austria has slowed negotiations in an effort to protect its banking interests, including the operations of Raiffeisen Bank in Russia, while Portugal has defended its fishing industry, which relies on Russian raw materials.
The European Union is now exploring the possibility of approving sanctions in smaller thematic groups, such as separate measures targeting the shadow fleet or the banking sector. However, this approach faces many of the same political obstacles as broader sanctions packages.
Restrictions aimed at maritime shipping still require the support of countries such as Greece, Cyprus, and Malta, each of which can block the proposal. At the same time, comprehensive sanctions packages have traditionally allowed negotiators to balance competing national interests by offering concessions in one area in exchange for support in another. Smaller thematic packages provide far less room for such compromises.
The European Commission may also attempt to reduce the influence of national vetoes by expanding the use of qualified majority voting in certain areas or by introducing secondary measures against member states that refuse to cooperate, including restrictions on access to financial mechanisms. Such steps could encourage quiet resistance at the national level, with authorities choosing not to enforce sanctions as strictly as intended.
Majority voting cannot apply to every area of EU governance. Decisions involving the common EU budget, migration policy, or the enlargement of the Union still require unanimous approval, giving dissatisfied member states additional leverage during future negotiations.
Countries that oppose changes to the sanctions process could also challenge the measures before the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, arguing that Brussels exceeded its authority under the Lisbon Treaty. Prolonged legal disputes could delay implementation for years while adding further strain to the European Union's institutional framework.
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