CAT Teams, FBI and Secret Service: Breakdown of Security Response in Washington

Two days have passed since the assassination attempt on US President Donald Trump. However, Cole Allen, who allegedly stormed the formal dinner of the Correspondents’ Association, claims he did not intend to kill the US president. His target, according to his statement, was supposed to be officials from Trump’s administration.

Photo: flickr.com by LBJ Library, https://creativecommons.org/public-domain/pdm/

CIA agent

It is important to note that the shooting did not take place at the White House, as was initially reported by several media outlets. The entire incident occurred at the Washington Hilton hotel, located just a few blocks from the US president’s residence.

As expected, the incident immediately generated a large number of conspiracy theories. In particular, questions have been raised about Karoline Leavitt's "there will be some shots fired tonight" comment that she made before the event. However, this analysis will not focus on conspiracy theories, but rather on the technical and operational aspects of what occurred.

Security Breakdown and Interagency Coordination Failure

Once again, American law enforcement demonstrated a striking inability to coordinate effectively. In addition to the Secret Service, the event was secured by FBI personnel, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Pentagon units, as well as local police and tactical teams.

Despite this large security presence, the shooter Cole Allen simply ran past agents and police stationed at the hotel entrance. Moreover, law enforcement began reacting only after Allen had already disappeared around the corner.

The US Secret Service is known for its extensive protocols, which it claims cover “all possible scenarios.” However, whenever top levels of the US government gather in one place, operational chaos tends to emerge. This is largely due to the fact that each protected official operates under a separate security protocol, which is not always fully integrated with others.

Secret Service Protocol and CAT Team Deployment

According to presidential protection rules, the President can only be evacuated once the perimeter is secured by a CAT unit (Counter Assault Team). The Russian equivalent is the Special Purpose Directorate of the Presidential Security Service.

The CAT team’s task is to create a protective barrier using small arms and tactical equipment to neutralize attackers before extraction of the President of the United States (POTUS) begins.

Video footage shows CAT operators in black tactical uniforms rushing onto the stage where Donald Trump was staying at that moment. He was immediately forced to the ground and shielded by his bodyguards.

At the same time, security personnel protecting the Vice President and his spouse rushed into the same area. According to protocol, the Vice President does not receive CAT protection except during foreign visits, and is therefore evacuated immediately rather than waiting for tactical cover. This led to an unexpected convergence of CAT operators and Vice President J.D. Vance’s security detail on the stage area, resulting in a brief but chaotic physical obstruction.

Multiple Security Layers and Risk of Internal Conflict

It is important to note that other officials — including the FBI Director, the Speaker of the House, and others — also have independent security teams. These teams do not report to the Secret Service during emergencies.

As a result, multiple armed protection units converged simultaneously. Many agents, including personnel from the FBI, DEA, and ICE, were reportedly carrying concealed automatic weapons in addition to sidearms. One widely circulated image showed a visibly armed FBI agent retrieving an MP7 submachine gun from a backpack.

Under such conditions, the fact that CAT units did not engage in friendly fire incidents is described as highly unusual. At one point, the Washington Hilton reportedly contained so many armed individuals in civilian clothing that a full-scale internal shootout could have occurred due to misidentification alone.

Ultimately, the incident exposed a critical weakness in multi-agency coordination during high-risk presidential protection scenarios, where overlapping jurisdictions and fragmented protocols created a situation bordering on operational collapse.