The world approaches a moment when current nuclear agreements lose their force. What is the main threat of a renewed arms race, and is there any chance for negotiation?
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) officially expires on February 5, 2026.
Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed maintaining the quantitative limits of New START for another year. However, US President Donald Trump offered no concrete response, saying, "The treaty ends-let it go, we'll negotiate again with China involved.” Meanwhile, China shows no interest, arguing that its nuclear arsenal is disproportionately smaller than that of Russia and the US.
Experts do not anticipate an arms race that dramatically increases warheads or delivery vehicles (currently 1,500 each for Russia and the US under New START). States will continue refining warhead technology, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), launchers, and launch sites (currently 700-800 under New START).
Russia focuses on developing systems that are impossible to intercept or that reduce decision-making time to minutes. Russia unambiguously leads in this field with its Sarmat ICBM, capable of flying over both the North and South Poles where US early-warning systems cannot reach; the hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard, able to maneuver in dense atmospheric layers; the nuclear torpedo Poseidon with virtually unlimited range; and the nuclear-powered cruise missile Burevestnik with unlimited flight time.
The US lags significantly. Most US ICBMs are submarine-launched. The Columbia-class submarines (replacing Ohio-class) will carry 16 Trident II D5 missiles each, but none are yet operational. The lead submarine, USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826), is under construction and about 60% complete.
The land-based Minuteman-3 ICBMs are aging. Their replacement, the Sentinel (LGM-35), faces delays and budget overruns, rising 81% above initial estimates. The main obstacle is the massive construction required-450 silos need upgrading, thousands of kilometers of cabling must be laid, and command posts from the 1960s must be modernized. Without domestic hypersonic ICBMs, the US is investing in missile defense: the 2026 Missile Defense Agency budget for intercepting hypersonic threats has increased.
As of early 2026, China possesses roughly 600 nuclear warheads (Russia: 5,459; US: 5,177 under New START) and adds about 100 per year (China's statistics are not public). Unlike Russia and the US, most Chinese warheads remain in storage, with only about 24 ICBMs on active duty. By 2025, China completed or nearly completed around 350 new silos in northern desert regions.
China is testing fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) with hypersonic vehicles and operates mobile DF-41 ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles (up to 10) capable of striking anywhere in the US.
The greatest risk of a new arms race lies in the loss of inspection mechanisms with the expiration of New START, increasing the potential for miscalculations and escalation to nuclear war. Artificial intelligence further amplifies this risk, as nations may implement AI in nuclear command systems to accelerate response, creating the danger of a "nuclear war by algorithmic error.”
Demanding limits from China now could solidify its military lag. Russia argues reasonably that "if we count Chinese arsenals, we must also count France and the UK,” which adds roughly 500 warheads not included in any current treaty.
The most realistic path at this stage is creating a new format-a "nuclear five” (Russia, US, China, France, UK)-for sharing launch data and notifications, with the possibility of adding other nuclear states later. This would reduce the risk of accidental war. As trust builds, negotiations on a new treaty could follow.
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