When Patriot missiles drag down the US president’s approval rating and turn into election ballots — the fourth part of the “Geopolitics in Simple Terms” series dedicated to the US war with Iran and its consequences.
Continued. Read Part I: America’s Military Machine in the Iran War
Part II: What Happened to America’s War Goals in Iran?
Part III: How Tehran Struck 15 US Military Sites Across the Middle East
In the previous part of “Geopolitics in Simple Terms,” we stopped at a rather strange outcome of the war. The United States declared Iran defeated, yet the operation’s original objectives began disappearing from the immediate agenda one after another. The nuclear program was postponed to subsequent negotiations, uranium enrichment was no longer a condition for an immediate ceasefire, ballistic missiles were pushed aside, and the demand to stop military and financial support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and other armed groups linked to Tehran effectively disappeared from the practical formula for a truce.
The Strait of Hormuz and several months of relative calm remained at the top of the agenda — a period of calm that Trump is somehow asking for. This raises a natural question: why exactly several months?
The answer may lie not in Tehran and not even in the Strait of Hormuz.
On November 3, 2026, America will vote in the midterm elections. The entire House of Representatives and a substantial portion of the Senate will be up for election. And the war that began as a demonstration of Donald Trump’s strength is gradually turning into a threat to his own political system.
Iran is absorbing the strikes. But will Trump survive the elections?
Iran Endures the Strikes. Can Trump Endure the Election?
When the war began, Trump’s approval rating stood at around 39%. By the time the preliminary agreement was reached and a new 60-day negotiating pause was announced, Reuters/Ipsos had recorded 34% — matching the low point of his second term. At the beginning of August, the latest Reuters/Ipsos poll put the figure at around 35%. In other words, the effect of a small victorious war somehow came without the small victory in the approval ratings.
The White House faces an even worse picture when it comes to Americans’ attitudes toward the war itself. In a July Washington Post/Ipsos poll, only 28% said the war was worth the costs incurred, while 68% said it was not. Approval of Trump’s handling of Iran stood at just 29%.
So the problem is no longer simply that the war has dragged on. The problem is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to explain to American voters exactly why they are paying for it. Most Americans do not care how many centrifuges remain at Natanz, what percentage of Iran’s fleet has been destroyed or how many launchers the US Air Force has bombed. But they see the number on the gas pump outside their homes several times a week. And that number has proved far more convincing than Pentagon press releases.
The War Has Arrived at the American Gas Pump
The day before the war began, the average price of a gallon of gasoline in the United States stood at around $2.98. Within a month, it had approached $4, while by the end of July the national average had reached $4.09 per gallon. AAA directly linked the continued high cost of fuel to instability around the Strait of Hormuz and high oil prices.
And here comes a particularly uncomfortable political irony for Trump. In 2024, he returned to the White House partly on a promise to make life cheaper for Americans. Now Trump himself has to explain why gasoline is once again approaching $4 a gallon and why one of the factors behind the increase is a war launched by his own administration.
The voter does not cast a ballot in distant Natanz. The voter casts it near a supermarket, a mortgage bill and a gas station.
According to the July Washington Post/Ipsos poll, 54% of registered voters identified the economy and high prices as one of the most important factors influencing their vote for Congress. Iran, Israel and foreign policy were directly cited by only 20%. At the same time, 33% approved of Trump’s economic policy, while 65% disapproved.
The war therefore affects the elections twice. It is unpopular in its own right. But even more dangerous for the White House is the way it turns into gasoline, transportation costs, inflation and household expenses.
More and more Americans are asking why they are paying for a war they do not need. They see American missiles flying over the Persian Gulf on television. And they do not understand why the bill is coming to them.
How Much Does 'Epic Fury' Cost?
There is another figure that ordinary Americans do not see directly at the checkout counter, but Congress sees very clearly. The first 32 days of Operation Epic Fury cost the federal budget approximately $27–28 billion, according to calculations by the Penn Wharton Budget Model. If the operation continued at the same intensity, direct costs over two months were estimated at $38–47 billion, excluding roughly $5 billion in indirect costs.
But money is not even the most unpleasant part of the arithmetic. Dollars can be borrowed, including from ourselves. Borrowing a Patriot missile is considerably harder.
The scale of spending on Patriot, THAAD, SM-3, SM-6, Tomahawk and other high-tech munitions has become so large that rebuilding stocks of some systems is now measured not in months, but in years. According to estimates by CSIS, at current production rates it will take three years or more to restore Tomahawk, Patriot and THAAD stocks to pre-war levels; for SM-3 and SM-6, the figure is around two years. By the end of July, Patriot stocks were estimated at fewer than 1,000 interceptors, while THAAD stocks stood at around 250.
The Pentagon has already demanded that the defense industry sharply accelerate production. Subsequent estimates put the decline in Patriot stocks at around 65% and the decline in THAAD stocks at no less than 38%.
There are also completely tangible and irreversible losses. According to the latest reports citing an investigation by The Washington Post, US forces lost at least 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones during the war — roughly a quarter of their fleet. A fully equipped Reaper with modern sensor systems can cost up to $50 million per aircraft.
Another unpleasant feature of modern warfare has emerged here. An aircraft that proved highly effective during years of operations against an adversary with weak air defenses has turned out to be an expensive and relatively vulnerable platform in an airspace saturated with air-defense systems. The Pentagon is already looking for a cheaper replacement that can be mass-produced and lost without having to write off tens of millions of dollars each time.
Therefore, every additional month of war now has to be measured not only in billions. It has to be measured in years of production needed to replace missiles and drones.
And here is the paradox: a war, and even a missile, can be launched with a single presidential order, but a new Patriot or THAAD cannot be produced with a presidential decree.
A War Iran’s Voters Are Not Fighting
This is where military strategy finally meets electoral mathematics. The latest Reuters/Ipsos poll shows that if congressional elections were held now, registered voters would prefer Democratic candidates over Republicans by roughly 41% to 37%. Trump’s own approval rating remains around 35%.
Trump therefore faces two completely different timelines. The military timeline says that if the adversary has not fulfilled the demands, pressure should continue. The political timeline says November 3 is already very close.
And if another escalation pushes oil prices higher, keeps gasoline above $4, requires another tens of billions of dollars and continues consuming America’s weapons stocks, another military success could prove too politically expensive.
First the war consumed missiles and drones. Now it is beginning to consume political image and votes.
The Capitol: Arithmetic That Cannot Be Bombed
The House of Representatives currently has 435 seats, but four are vacant. The formal breakdown is 218 Republicans, 212 Democrats and one independent. Independent Kevin Kiley continues to work with the Republican caucus, so in practical terms the White House can currently count on roughly 219 lawmakers in its camp. That is a majority in which just a few dissatisfied Republicans can already stop a bill backed by their own administration.
The situation is outwardly more comfortable for Trump in the Senate: 53 Republicans, 45 Democrats and two independent senators who caucus with the Democrats. In practical terms, the balance is 53–47. Democrats would need to gain four seats to secure a stable majority.
Forecasts therefore differ between the two chambers. The Cook Political Report currently considers Democrats the favorites in the battle for the House of Representatives, although it stresses that the outcome remains far from certain. Under a distribution of swing districts favorable to Republicans, its calculations give the GOP around 221 seats; a strong night for Democrats could give them roughly 228.
The Senate is considerably more difficult for Democrats. The electoral map is structurally more favorable to Republicans, and the current baseline forecast suggests that Democrats are likely to move closer to a majority but may fall short. In other words, the most likely unpleasant scenario for Trump is the loss of the House of Representatives. But there is also a significantly more serious possibility: Democrats take both chambers of Congress.
And then we are talking about much more than a lost election. We are talking about a completely different presidency.
If Trump Loses the Capitol
If Republicans lose both chambers of Congress, American bombers will of course not turn around over the Persian Gulf at midnight and fly home. Trump will remain president and commander-in-chief. But a much more comfortable era for him will end — the era in which the president gives an order and his own party opens the checkbook.
The American system is rather unforgiving toward any president who decides that he is the state. The sword belongs to the president. The wallet belongs to Congress.
Trump will be able to order strikes. But a long war requires aircraft, missiles, new Patriots and THAAD systems, contracts, replenished stockpiles and tens of billions of dollars. And the money will have to be requested from Democrats. A completely different war will begin there. Tehran will have to be persuaded to open the Strait of Hormuz. Democrats will have to be persuaded to open the budget.
Congress will not be able to switch off the US military with a single vote. Already allocated funds will continue to be spent, signed contracts will continue to be fulfilled and paid-for weapons will continue to arrive. But there is still no endless warehouse of missiles beneath the White House. New weapons orders, replenishment of depleted stockpiles and additional months of war will once again require appropriations.
And then every presidential “we will deliver a devastating blow” could come with a rather humiliating continuation: “if Congress provides the money.” Trump will be able to veto laws he dislikes. But he cannot veto money that Congress simply has not given him.
Iran Will Be Far From the Main Problem
Losing the Capitol would affect far more than the war with Iran. A significant part of the enormous political showcase of Trump’s second term would come under threat.
The Board of Peace for Gaza? No one can prevent Trump from remaining chairman of a beautiful international council. He can hold meetings, pose for photographs and announce grand reconstruction plans. But when the time comes to pay for security, infrastructure and international programs, the bill will have to go to Democrats. And it may turn out that the most expensive part of the new Middle East is getting Congress to sign off on it.
NATO? Trump can continue criticizing Europeans, demanding more money and explaining who is feeding whom. But radically reshaping US participation in the alliance will become much harder without the legislative branch. Presidential rhetoric will remain threatening. Presidential freedom of action will not.
Greenland? Trump can continue to regard it as beautiful real estate. Very strategic real estate, too. But between the statement “we need Greenland” and buying Greenland stands an inconvenient institution called Congress. It controls the money. So Trump can dream about Greenland completely free of charge. Buying it will require Democrats’ money.
The same will happen with many other grand projects — new military programs, foreign aid packages, international agreements, sanctions arrangements and expensive foreign-policy initiatives.
A presidential order to go to war takes one pen. A budget, for some reason, does not.
And Then People Will Come With Subpoenas
But a lack of money may not even be the most unpleasant part of the new political reality. If Democrats take the House of Representatives, they will gain control of the committees. Along with it will come investigations, hearings, document requests and the ability to spend hours asking administration officials questions that the White House would rather answer with a single tweet.
How much did the war with Iran cost? On what legal basis was it conducted? Where did the missiles go? Why did the objectives of the war change? What did intelligence know? Who made the decisions? Who received the defense contracts? And why, after announcing a brilliant victory, did America suddenly begin asking for another two months of calm?
The final two years of Trump’s presidency, which he would surely like to devote to building a historic legacy, could turn into an endless route from the White House to congressional committees, lawyers and television cameras.
And where there are investigations, an old acquaintance of Trump’s quickly appears in American politics: the word “impeachment.” A Democratic majority in the Senate by itself does not mean that lawmakers could remove the president: conviction requires a two-thirds vote. But removal is not necessary to create political paralysis.
They can simply investigate for two years. Call ministers for two years. Demand documents for two years. Spend two years explaining to the country why another “greatest victory in history” somehow requires another billion-dollar appropriation.
The White House Will Remain, But It Will Not Hold All the Keys
Losing the Senate would add another problem. The president does not appoint ministers, ambassadors, federal judges and other key officials in Washington entirely on his own. If Democrats take control of the Senate, the White House personnel machine will lose considerable speed.
Trump will remain the master of the White House. But it will become clear that the keys to many doors are kept in another building.
And that is precisely why November 3 is much more than an ordinary midterm election. Trump himself will not be able to run for another term in 2028. Therefore, Americans will not only vote for representatives and senators. They will effectively deliver the first nationwide verdict on his second presidency.
Losing the House is unpleasant. Losing the Senate is very unpleasant. Losing both chambers after two years of complete Republican control is already a political diagnosis. And two years later, the bill will be handed to his successor. The Republican candidate in 2028 will have to explain why the party won the White House and Congress, began reshaping America and the world — and two years later Americans took legislative power away from it.
That is something Trump’s own party may genuinely never forgive him for. Not Iran. Not Hormuz. Not tens of billions of dollars. Not lost Reapers. But the fact that after all the talk of restoring greatness, he could leave his party a very particular legacy: a Democratic Congress, a paralyzed White House and the threat of losing the 2028 presidential election.
That is why the current pause in the war has more than just a military logic. Iran may survive American bombing. Trump has to survive the American vote. And perhaps that is precisely why Tehran does not need to defeat America right now. It only needs to make it to November.
Iran Needs to Survive Three Months to Win
And all of this is perfectly clear in Tehran. It appears that time itself is at the heart of Iran’s strategy today. Iran no longer needs to defeat the United States — it only needs to avoid losing until the American elections. That is why Tehran says neither a final “yes” nor a final “no”: negotiations begin, break down and resume; new conditions appear, followed by another pause. This controlled uncertainty keeps markets nervous: any statement about Hormuz or a new escalation of the war moves oil prices, followed by gasoline and inflation expectations, and then interest rates in American polls begin to move as well.
Over the next three months, this will probably become the main substance of the confrontation. Washington needs calm, cheap oil and no new American casualties. Tehran needs time. Every month that passes without capitulation brings Iran not closer to a military victory over America, but closer to the point at which the cost of continuing the war for Trump may become higher than the price of a compromise with Iran.
Therefore, until November 3, we will most likely witness a strange war of waiting: negotiations without a final agreement, threats without an immediate strike, Hormuz as a lever constantly hanging over the market, and Washington forced to look not only at the map of the Middle East but also at American approval ratings. Tehran needs to survive three months. Trump needs to win them.
In the next part of “Geopolitics in Simple Terms,” we will examine the question that may interest readers most: who made money from this war? Why, amid missiles, Hormuz and talk of a ceasefire, do stock markets sometimes fall and then rebound sharply, while oil prices jump along with politicians’ statements and some companies lose billions as others make them? Who is profiting from this instability, who emerged as the war’s main financial beneficiary, and how accidental are these strange market movements? We will discuss all of this in the next investigation.
