The Crisis of the World Order: Democracy, NATO, AI, and Emerging Multipolar Era

The past few years-or rather, recent events-have forced even those who have never been interested in political philosophy to reflect on the world order. We live in a world that, after World War II, was designed as a system to prevent new global conflicts.

Photo: commons.wikimedia.org by xlibber, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

United Nations Organization

To achieve this, the United Nations, international courts, collective security institutions, and dozens of treaties and organizations were created to guarantee peace, development, and cooperation among states.

The assumption was that the spread of democracy, international law, and economic interdependence would gradually make wars the exception rather than the rule.

Something Has Broken in the International Order

But if we honestly look around us, a question inevitably arises: is this system really functioning as it was intended?

Today, the Middle East is once again at the center of armed confrontation. The world is discussing not only another war but also the possibility that states openly speaking about destroying other nations could acquire nuclear weapons. Terrorism has not disappeared. Millions of refugees from Africa and the Middle East continue to reshape Europe's political and social landscape. Many African countries remain trapped in chronic poverty and humanitarian crises.

Meanwhile, international organizations hold endless meetings, adopt resolutions, publish statements, establish commissions, and create working groups. Yet there is an increasing sense that behind all this activity lies an inability to influence real events.

Bureaucracy has become highly effective at demonstrating activity, spending budgets, and producing documents, yet the world has not become any safer as a result. Recent revelations surrounding U. S. international aid programs have only confirmed what many had long suspected: billions of dollars went toward maintaining a vast industry of grants, consultants, activists, and contractors that became exceptionally skilled at spending taxpayers' money but far less effective at solving the world's real problems.

The number of reports increased, but peace, stability, and development somehow did not.

NATO: Everyone for Themselves-or for the Money?

This becomes especially apparent during serious crises. Whenever the threat of a major war emerges, many alliances that were considered unshakable for decades suddenly appear far less resilient than previously believed.

Take NATO. For decades, the world was told that it was not merely a military alliance but the foundation of collective security for the Western world. The United States served as its principal architect, guarantor, and financial backer. However, once the prospect of a serious conflict involving Iran and the risk of a large-scale war in the Middle East arose, it became evident that many allies were not prepared to share either the responsibility or the possible consequences.

In effect, a number of European states, in the words of Emmanuel Macron, made it clear: this is not our war, and we never voted for it.

This raises a simple question. If the largest military alliance of the modern era is unwilling to present a united front when one of its leading members speaks of a grave threat to international security, then what was the alliance created for?

Moreover, this entire situation unexpectedly exposed another issue that is discussed far less frequently in the West. When it comes to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO and the alliance's leading members demonstrate almost unlimited involvement. Weapons are supplied, tens and hundreds of billions of dollars are allocated, political decisions are made, sanctions are imposed, summits are held, and new support programs are established.

Yet an uncomfortable question remains. If this truly concerns the collective security of Europe, as NATO repeatedly states, why are Ukrainians doing most of the fighting? If this is a common struggle for Western security, why are Western armies not directly participating?

The resulting picture appears rather unusual. Moreover, a significant share of military supplies is not provided free of charge. Major defense corporations receive lucrative contracts, the defense industry expands production, and military budgets in many countries reach record levels.

That leads to another uncomfortable question. Has the modern system of collective security become better at profiting from wars than at preventing them?

If the world's largest military alliances prove more effective at financing conflicts than preventing them, perhaps it is not individual policies or individual conflicts that are in crisis. Perhaps it is the very model of the world order established after World War II.

In that case, it becomes apparent that the problem may lie not with individual politicians or particular conflicts, but with the structure of the modern international order itself.

Democracy as a Universal Answer?

For decades, humanity was presented with a relatively simple formula. It was believed that there existed a universal model of societal development that would eventually become an example for every nation. The assumption was that the spread of democracy would automatically bring greater prosperity, stronger rule of law, fewer conflicts, and a higher quality of life.

Reality, however, has proved far more complicated. If democracy is truly a universal solution, why has the number of global conflicts not declined? Why do many democratic states continue to struggle with serious economic and social problems? Why have many authoritarian states demonstrated faster development in infrastructure, industry, technology, and public administration?

One only has to look at modern migration flows to see one of the greatest paradoxes of our time.

Millions of people from Africa and the Middle East seek to reach Europe. This is usually explained as a search for security and a better life. But, honestly speaking, Europe's attractiveness is connected not only with freedoms and democratic institutions but also with its extensive social welfare system. In other words, people can survive, receive benefits, and raise families through support provided by the European Union.

This prompts another question. Why are so many entrepreneurs, investors, engineers, and high-tech professionals increasingly choosing to live and work in the Gulf states?

Why do people with capital, knowledge, and valuable expertise often prefer relocating not to the world's most democratic countries but to states commonly described as authoritarian?

Perhaps because people vote not with political theories but with their own interests. Some seek protection and genuine comfort. Others seek security and convenience. Still others pursue business opportunities and professional growth.

All of this raises a simple yet uncomfortable question: does one universal model of society truly exist that is equally suitable for every nation and every people? Or has real life long since proved far more complex than political theory?

I am not claiming that democracy is bad. But an increasingly important question arises: why is the democratic model declared to be the only correct one for every nation and every state without exception?

Why are historical traditions, cultural characteristics, religious differences, levels of social development, and the unique experiences of individual nations so rarely taken into account?

After all, the world has never been uniform. Israel is not Sweden. India is not France. Saudi Arabia is not Canada. China is not Germany. So why should one political model suit them all?

Especially when modern democracy itself increasingly raises difficult questions. Election campaigns in the world's largest countries now cost hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. Political success depends more and more on financial resources, media influence, and technological capabilities.

This leads to another uncomfortable question. If enormous financial resources are necessary to win "democratic" elections, how democratic do such elections remain?

And if political competition increasingly becomes a contest of financial power, is democracy gradually transforming into another form of elite rule?

The World Is Changing Faster Than Political Systems

There is another issue that still receives far less attention than it deserves. We are entering the age of artificial intelligence. We are regularly presented with science-fiction scenarios in which machines take control of humanity. We are told that robots will replace people in the workplace. Around the world, we see waves of automation and job reductions.

At the same time, something else is happening. We are no longer able to abandon technologies that are gradually becoming the foundation of everyday life.

Hospital waiting lists. Bank loans. Airline tickets and hotel reservations. Government services. Municipal services. Police. Security systems. Social media. Financial oversight.

Virtually every key area of modern life is becoming increasingly dependent on digital platforms, algorithms, and data analytics systems. That is why the main question is not whether technology will enter politics.

To be honest – and as a political strategist I can confidently say this – it already has.

The more important question is who will control these technologies, and in whose interests they will be used.

Most interestingly, both democratic and authoritarian states are beginning to use remarkably similar digital governance tools.

The state collects data. The state analyzes data. The state predicts citizens' behavior. The state develops digital services and monitoring mechanisms. Often, the difference lies only in the explanation.

In one case, this is described as caring for citizens. In another, it is explained as ensuring national security. Yet the technologies themselves are becoming increasingly similar.

Perhaps, then, the defining debate of the twenty-first century will no longer be between democracy and autocracy as these concepts are traditionally understood. Perhaps humanity will instead be choosing between different models of the digital state.

A Few Thoughts Instead of Conclusions

I am not offering ready-made solutions. I am not writing a political manifesto. I do not claim to know all the answers. But the more I observe what is happening in Israel, the Middle East, and our increasingly unsettled world, the more often I find myself asking several simple questions.

What if humanity should abandon the idea that there is only one correct model of development?

What if a stable world order is impossible without recognizing the right of different states and civilizations to choose their own path?

What if a multipolar world is not a threat but a natural stage in humanity's development, where several centers of power are compelled to negotiate with one another rather than impose their will on everyone else?

What if the main criterion for judging a state in the twenty-first century is no longer the name of its political system but its ability to provide security, development, justice, and a decent quality of life for its citizens?

And finally, what if artificial intelligence and digital governance gradually transform the very nature of the state to such an extent that the familiar debate between democracy and autocracy loses much of its significance?

Perhaps I am mistaken. Perhaps many readers will disagree with me.

But it seems to me that today we spend far too much time discussing current conflicts and far too little time talking about the world that is taking shape before our eyes.

We argue about consequences but rarely discuss causes.

We debate the latest war but scarcely discuss the rules of the world that should emerge after it.

That is why I want to end this text not with a conclusion but with an invitation to a conversation.

Am I really the only one concerned by all of this?

Am I really the only one who feels that the world has reached the threshold of profound change?

And if those changes are indeed inevitable, what kind of world do we want to see twenty or thirty years from now?

And what place do we ourselves want to occupy in that world-here, in our own world?