Why Trump Isn't Hitting Russia Harder: Investment Bankers Weigh In

As President Donald Trump charts a cautious course in response to Russia’s ongoing actions in Ukraine, speculation has mounted over the motivations behind his restraint. Is it fear of escalation with Moscow, or is the former president simply constrained by the limited tools at his disposal? A recent analysis shared by investment banking professionals from New York and London sheds light on the practical and geopolitical factors shaping Trump’s approach. Drawing from insider perspectives at Goldman Sachs and the London financial sector, the commentary outlines why major punitive steps—such as secondary sanctions, advanced weapons transfers, or oil price manipulation—may be politically risky, militarily ineffective, or economically damaging. Their views offer a sobering counterpoint to calls for more aggressive U.S. action and suggest that any substantial shift in strategy may hinge on diplomatic developments in Istanbul or a further escalation in Russian airstrikes.

Photo: President Trump addressing the nation by Белый дом, https://creativecommons.org/public-domain/pdm/

US President Donald Trump

Here is an interesting opinion from a Goldman Sachs investment banker on the reasons behind Trump's current policy on Russia:

“Some people think Trump is afraid of Putin, which is why he’s doing nothing. Unfortunately, he practically has no levers of influence.

1. The idea of secondary sanctions on countries buying energy resources from Russia, with tariffs up to 500%. Which countries are we talking about? India, China, the EU. Trump is already in a tariff war with them, and even much smaller tariffs are scaring markets, especially the UST (U.S. Treasury), whose stability the 'stable genius' quite rationally cares about. It’s not even funny.
2. Supplying long-range missiles without restrictions on strikes inside Russia. Yes, a few hundred hits on sensitive spots around Moscow might make Putin more flexible. But the U.S. simply doesn't have anything in that range. It doesn’t have land-based ballistic systems like Iskander. It has the Tomahawk — an outdated cruise missile, easily intercepted, meant for wars against 'natives,' not against a country with some of the best air defense systems in the world. And launching it from land is not trivial — it’s a naval missile, and the U.S. never planned for ground combat.
3. The most dangerous move would be to crash oil prices. That — they can do. Not to $20, as I previously said — someone rightly pointed that out — but down to around $40. At $20, shale producers would suffer badly. I think Trump will go for it. But this is a move with consequences in a 2–3 year horizon. Its impact on the Ukraine war would be very limited. And Trump won’t link it directly to Ukraine.”

And a comment on this from another investment banker, now based in London:

“Absolutely spot-on analysis. That’s exactly how it is. Those of us in investment banking are used to thinking fast at the intersection of money, geopolitics, and pricing… I’d add a few points to my colleague’s sound arguments:

1. The Saudis and OPEC could live with $40 oil in the short term, but for many of them, it's extremely uncomfortable in the medium term (due to high announced spending and budgets).
2. Trump might impose some form of sanctions (though in a very ‘decorative’ manner, and without 500% secondary tariffs — which would hurt Western economies and severely complicate his expected dialogue with Xi in June). He may do it just to tick a box and deflect criticism in Congress and Europe, but will tread carefully to avoid real damage.
3. Europe itself has very limited missile stock for such deliveries — perhaps around 200 if they really tried. So from a military standpoint, this is more psychological and political than actual military pressure.

And the cherry on top: any real action can be likely only after the next meeting in Istanbul regarding the memorandum — and only if Russian air attacks continue at the current scale.”