Constitutional Court strips post-commencement financiers of voting rights in South African business rescue

South Africa's business rescue framework, established under Section 151 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, has undergone a significant structural adjustment following a recent Constitutional Court ruling. The decision clarifies the voting rights of post-commencement financiers (PCFs) in the approval of rescue plans, a procedural change with direct implications for the stability of the insolvency market and the handling of large-scale state and private sector distress cases, including South African Airways (SAA) and Vantage Goldfields. The ruling strips PCFs of the right to vote on the adoption of a business rescue plan, a move intended to prevent new debt holders from dictating the outcome to the detriment of pre-commencement creditors and other affected persons.

The core mechanism of the change lies in the definition of the voting body. Previously, legal ambiguity allowed post-commencement creditors-those who inject capital into a company after it enters rescue-to participate in the vote under Section 151 meetings. The Constitutional Court has determined that the plan must be voted on by a defined body of pre-commencement creditors, those owed money at the time the company enters the rescue process. This creates a fixed baseline for the economic restructuring, theoretically preventing new financiers from leveraging their position to alter terms that disadvantage existing stakeholders. As Koos Benadie, director of insolvency, business rescue and restructuring at Barnard Incorporated Attorneys, noted, this exclusion is based on the premise that PCFs already possess an advantage through the security and preferential terms they negotiate before entering the process.

This legal clarification carries immediate retrospective risk. Benadie indicated that plans approved in the last three years where PCFs held a vote could be subject to review or reopening, as their participation may have skewed the voting outcome. For entities like SAA, whose turnaround is characterized by extreme complexity and a vast number of creditors, this ruling impacts the strategic calculation of new funders. The statutory timeframe for business rescue, typically three months, is often cited as unrealistic for large enterprises. Benadie pointed out that the scale of SAA's creditor base made a turnaround within that window impossible, highlighting a structural mismatch between the legislative timeline and the operational reality of large-scale corporate distress.

The exclusion of PCF voting rights introduces a new variable into the funding market. Without a vote, post-commencement financiers must rely entirely on the contractual security of their loans. Eric Levenstein, head of insolvency and business rescue at Werksmans Attorneys, suggests this will force creditors to lay down stricter terms regarding interest, repayment schedules, and security structures before committing capital. This shifts the risk management from the collective voting process to the individual contract. Levenstein also anticipates a potential shift in market dynamics, where banks may offload non-performing loans (NPLs) to third-party debt buyers who might subsequently provide PCF, although he cautions that the availability of such funding is yet to be tested in the market.

The practical application of business rescue remains contentious, particularly for capital-intensive industries like aviation. Blacky Komani, chair of FlySafair and former CEO of 1Time, argues that the framework is poorly suited for airlines. He describes a vicious cycle where the rescue process delays passenger booking, reducing immediate cash flow while simultaneously triggering demands from creditors for upfront payments and increased guarantees from aircraft lessors. This cash-flow compression undermines the financial stability the rescue process is meant to provide. Komani emphasizes that the failure often stems from a breakdown in trust between management and practitioners, where the latter may waste time attempting to reinvent operational solutions rather than supporting existing competent teams, thereby extending the period of financial leakage.

For mining and industrial sectors, the prolonged nature of insolvency proceedings has tangible operational and human costs. Vantage Goldfields, whose Barbrook and Lily mines entered business rescue in 2016 following a fatal underground pillar collapse, illustrates the long-term consequences of delayed finalization. Decades of litigation have prevented the recovery of workers' remains and the settlement of employee claims until a new buyer, Lions Bay Resources, intervened. Lions Bay has specifically cited the Constitutional Court ruling in its defense, as a post-commencement creditor has applied to overturn the existing rescue plan. The High Court has heard the application, with judgment pending, demonstrating that the ruling's impact is already being tested in active litigation. The case underscores that for companies with essential duties or significant physical liabilities, the speed and finality of the rescue process are as critical as the financial restructuring itself.

The broader economic context suggests that the demand for efficient insolvency mechanisms will increase. Allianz forecasts a 5% rise in global insolvencies in 2026, following a 6% increase in 2025, marking five consecutive years of growth. In this environment, the South African framework must balance the protection of existing stakeholders with the attraction of new capital. The Constitutional Court's ruling aims to restore predictability to the voting process, but its ultimate effect will depend on whether the market perceives the removal of PCF voting rights as a protection of creditor interests or a deterrent to new financing. The distinction between a successful rescue and a delayed liquidation remains a critical factor for businesses navigating the current economic climate.

Author`s name Oksana Anikina
News Correspondent at Pravda.Ru, working for the English edition of the site.