US Army’s Human Terrain System: From Super Concept to Absolute Farce
As of this writing, sources indicate that HTS program management has lobbied hard to gain a foothold in AFRICOM where poorly trained HTT’s would be deployed throughout the volatile Horn of Africa. Yet, according to the source, no hard requirements have been set for simple matters such as the amount of country visa’s needed for program participants.
One source indicated that HTT’s “are studying politics (which has some cultural elements) but not culture in the restricted sense…Most of the [HTT] reports are boilerplate…Personnel (recruiting, vetting, etc.)…there are big problems there. Someone who really understands what HTT is all about needs to be interviewing potential recruits…BAE has got to go. I did not hear one positive comment about BAE during my entire time at Ft. Leavenworth or in the field…” Other sources have stated that the prime contractor BAE Systems is taking the brunt of the criticism for the program management’s failings. Further, anyone removed from the HTS program that dares to criticize it is pilloried vindictively.
HTS: The Program from Hell
“What the hell is going on,” said a source. “There is something wrong here. This was a super concept but the HTS program management did not have the people to execute or support the HTS concept. No one is in charge at the higher levels and there is no way to get rid of anyone. They were told early on that someone would die because they [anthropologists/social scientists] are not qualified for military operations and do not understand where they fit in [with the military] or recognize just how dangerous the environment they are in is. They are allowed to go their own way.”
It is reported that the deaths of HTT members Nicole Suveges (Iraq) and Michael Bhatia (Afghanistan) were the result of command detonated mines/IED’s indicating that they were being tracked by adversaries. According to sources, both targets could have been better prepared had instructions and training proposed early in the life of the HTS program been adopted and executed. Forgotten is the fact that a US soldier on Suveges’ HTT was wounded in the same blast and had to be airlifted to Germany.
One person indicated that Suveges had attempted to contact another colleague in Iraq shortly before her death, but those calls were ignored because “she talked too much.” “Why wasn’t she calling the lead anthropologist, Dr. McFate, or a field advisor? Who is managing or advising the HTTs once they are deployed into combat?”
One source stated that the HTS Program is so concerned with recruiting more members and seeking more funding that very little attention is paid to those already deployed. “They [HTT’s] become the responsibility of the military unit to which they are assigned.”
“Honor and integrity used to mean something,” said one source. Another said, “You can’t attack all the people in the program—some making a living, some trying hard—but to say that attacking the Army’s [TRADOC] HTS program is un-American is wrong. It’s leadership that has caused all these problems. If anything, questioning a program gone wrong is pro-American and pro-Army. Many want to see things done right. It’s a leadership problem! Much attention has been paid in the media to questioning team members’ qualifications, yet no one has questioned the qualifications of the program leaders.”
John Stanton is a Virginia based writer specializing in national security and political matters. His most recent book is Talking Politics with God and the Devil in Washington, DC. Reach him at cioran123@yahoo.com. This is Part II on the HTS program. Part I was titled US Army Human Terrain System in Disarray. Questions/comments concerning this article were sent by email to the US Army (TRADOC) HTS Program Public Affairs Office. Through no fault of their own, they could not meet the author’s accelerated deadline.
