Deja vu - the search for Weapons of Mass Destruction this time in Iran

(Continued. Read Part II of the story here)

As I write these sentences, there is a growing sense of déjà vu: in the past few months media reports have speculated that Washington is thinking an aggressive, pre-emptive nuclear bombardment of Iran to destroy the deep underground Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran may be attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, and it is undeniably clear that Iran's newly-elected President Ahmadinejad, with his extreme nationalist demagogy, has a more confrontational policy than his predecessors, but the Iranian regime is not suicidal, considering the riches Iran sits on. And so far there is no evidence that they have come close to building nuclear weapons.

Tehran has declared that it is interested solely in a nuclear power industry and insisted on its right as a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory to develop all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors have been in Iran for more than 3 years investigating all claims of weapons-related work. On 3 October 2004, Mohammed el-Baradei, the head of the IAEA, declared that 'Iran has no nuclear weapons programme. So far I see nothing that could be called an imminent danger. I have seen no nuclear weapons programme in Iran. What I have seen is that Iran is trying to gain access to nuclear enrichment technology, and so far there is no danger in Iran'. American officials later accused the IAEA of irresponsibility and having a lenient approach and Iran of deceit. Whether Iran is pursuing a secret weapons programme, or will in the future, is unsettled. The Bush administration, however, seems to have already made up its mind on this point. In a provocative speech to an influential pro-Israeli lobby group - the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) - on 5 March 2006, US ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, bluntly threatened Iran with 'painful consequences' if it failed to accede completely to Washington's demands.

On 16 March 2006, the Bush administration, updating a national security strategy that laid the groundwork for invading Iraq in 2003, singled out Iran as the greatest single current danger, alleging that Iran's nuclear threat is the biggest future challenge to the U.S. For over a year, the administration has been working on the revision of its original strategy, issued in September 2002. 'We face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran', 49-page 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review says the Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq. We will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse consequences of their bad conduct.'

The strategy expands on the original security framework developed by the Bush administration in September 2002. That strategy had shifted U.S. foreign policy away from decades of deterrence and containment toward a more aggressive stance of attacking enemies before they attack the United States. This is the same pattern of lies and deception with respect to the so-called 'Iran threat', purposefully hyperinflated so as to manipulate public opinion and the US Congress, to increase military spending to unnecessary levels and to smooth the path to war.

After three weeks of arduous negotiations and US bullying, on 30 March, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a statement giving Iran 30 days to abandon its uranium enrichment activities, but the non-binding statement did not mention steps the council might take if Tehran fails to comply. Following the statement, the US officials hailed the draft as a breakthrough and said that the threat of military action must remain on the table. With the UN statement on Iran, the US administration seems to have taken one more step towards intervening either covertly or overtly in Iran. Soon after this, in early April, the Washington Post, citing unnamed U.S. officials and independent analysts, reported that the administration was studying options for strikes against Iran as part of a broader strategy of coercive diplomacy. To all these the Iranian President responded on 8 May 2006, in a cleverly drafted letter to the US President, making the point that the Bush administration's policy towards Iran is misconceived and dangerous.

Whether an attack on Iran comes, by US cruise missiles or B2s or Israeli warplanes carrying US-supplied bunker busters to penetrate deep into the earth to cripple Iran's fledging subterranean nuclear power industry, the main forces that drive the US to war will be the same as those that compelled the US, with Britain and other allies, to attack Iraq. Similar to the war against Iraq, possible military operations against Iran have very little to do with the Iranian regime's imaginary Weapons of Mass Destruction, and they are not even only about oil. They are essentially about the political control of oil supplies on terms favourable to the US. Here 'political control' means not only controlling access to oil - America has large oil reserves and diversified sources from abroad - but ensuring that oil is priced in dollars.